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INTRODUCTION

The sanctions provision of the Freedom of Information Act
amendments (Amendments)' provides a procedure whereby agency
personnel who have withheld requested information may be subject
to disciplinary action if a court, in ordering production of the documents and assessing against the United States reasonable attorneys'
fees and other litigation costs, also issues a finding that a question
of fact exists as to whether agency personnel acted arbitrarily or
capriciously. Although the provision is relatively brief, it is potentially the most important amendment to the Freedom of Information Act (FOLA) and one of the most important congressional enactments in recent years. This article explores the legislative history of
the sanctions provision, analyzes the present provision in detail,
examines questions which may arise from interpretation and imple* B.A., 1966; J.D., 1969, University of Oklahoma; LL.M., 1970, Harvard University; Associate Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University.
This article is based upon material which will appear in PRINcIPLEs OF CIVIL SERV-

ICE LAw, to be published in 1976.
1. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(F) (Supp. 1, 1975), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)
(1970). The amendment provides:
Whenever the court orders the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant and assesses against the United States
reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs, and the court additionally
issues a written finding that the circumstances surrounding the withholding
raise questions whether agency personnel acted arbitrarily or capriciously
with respect to the withholding, the Civil Service Commission shall promptly
initiate a proceeding to determine whether disciplinary action is warranted
against the officer or employee who was primarily responsible for the withholding. The Commission, after investigation and consideration of the evidence submitted, shall submit its findings and recommendations to the administrative authority of the agency concerned and shall send copies of the
findings and recommendations to the officer or employee or his representative. The administrative authority shall take the corrective action that the
Commission recommends.
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mentation of the provision, and discusses the importance of the
sanctions provision in FOIA litigation.
I.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The sanctions provision developed as a response to commentary
advocating the development of personal accountability of federal
employees, 2 and followed some unsuccessful attempts to include
sanctions provisions in other legislation.3 Although other responses
were suggested,4 the recommendation that a sanctions provision be
included in the FOIA amendments was made to the congressional
subcommittees by Ralph Nader.5 The original draft considered by
2. See R. VAUGHN, THE SPOILED SYSTEM: A CALL FOR CIVIL SERVICE REFORM, ch. 8
(1975) (first released in draft form June, 1972). For an extended discussion of
personal accountability see Vaughn, The Personal Accountability of Public Employees, infra at 85.
3. A proposed provision of the Consumer Product Safety Act, subsequently deleted, provided for civil action against an employee who breached his fiduciary duty
to the public:
Any person in the Agency, who administers, enforces or implements any
portion of this Act is a fiduciary to any individual who might be personally
injured or killed by any consumer product which presents an unreasonable
risk of injury and, as a fiduciary, is obligated to prevent such injury or death
by prohibiting the exposure of individuals to consumer products presenting
unreasonable risk of injury or death. If the court finds that any person or
persons in the Agency have breached their fiduciary duty by any act or
omission or by any series of acts or omissions the court shall order performance or cessation of performance, as appropriate; may temporarily suspend
any person or persons from the Agency for a period not exceeding three
months; may remove an individual or individuals from the Agency; or may
take any other appropriate action against any person or persons in the
Agency who have breached the fiduciary relationship.
R. VAUGHN, THE SPOILED SYSTEM: A CALL FOR CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 163 (1975),
quoting STAFF OF SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., CONSUMER
PRODUCT SAFETY ACT (Comm. Print No. 2, 1972).

4. For example, Mitchell Rogovin, General Counsel of Common Cause, suggested a statutory annual report to Congress by each agency based "on the belief
that no law can be enforced on the Federal bureaucracy without continuous outside
reinforcement of the spirit of the law." HearingsBefore a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Gov't Operations,92d Cong., 2d Sess., vol. I, pt. 5, at 1491 (1972), cited
in

HOUSE COMM. ON

GOV'T

MATION ACT, H.R. REP.
as HOUSE REPORT].

OPERATIONS, ADMINISTRATION OF THE FREEDOM OF INFOR-

No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1972) [hereinafter cited

5. Hearingson S. 858, S. Con. Res. 30, S.J. Res. 72, S. 1106, S. 1142, S. 1520, S.
1923, and S. 2073 Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Operations and the Subcomms.
on Separationof Powers and Administrative Practiceand Procedureof the Senate
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the Senate subcommittees would have allowed courts to apply criminal sanctions against a federal employee for withholding documents without a reasonable basis in law.' A subsequent draft provided for civil penalties, in the form of fines, to be assessed by
courts.' The provision, as finally approved by the Senate Judiciary
Committee and passed by the Senate, left it to courts to determine
what constitutes a violation of the provision and imposed civil service sanctions rather than civil penalties.'
The House version of the FOIA amendments did not provide for
any sanctions to be taken against individual government employees
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., vol. I, at 209 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings], cited in SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AMENDING THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. Another witness stated:
One major reason the bureaucratic attitude "when in doubt, withhold" is so
entrenched is that it is rooted in legal self protection. An official is held
individually accountable under criminal statutes for releasing trade secrets
or other confidential information but faces no sanction at all if he illegally
withholds information from the public.
Id., vol. II, at 105, cited in HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 38.
Witnesses testified on the FOIA proposals on April 11-12, May 9, June 7-8, 11,
and 26. Id., vol. I, at 90-176, 321-74 & vol. II, at 1-275.
6.

STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, FREEDOM

No. 1, on file at the offices of both the
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure and the American University Law Review.
OF INFORMATION ACT PROVISIONS DRAFT

7.

STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, FREEDOM OF

2, on file at the offices of both the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure and the American University
Law Review.
INFORMATION ACT PROVISIONS DRAFT No.

8. S. 2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973) (as amended and passed). This version
provided:
Whenever records are ordered by the court to be made available under this
section, the court shall on motion by the complainant find whether the withholding of such records was without reasonable basis in law and which Federal officer or employee was responsible for the withholding. Before such
findings are made, any officers or employees named in the complainant's
motion shall be personally served a copy of such motion and shall have 20
days in which to respond thereto, and shall be afforded an opportunity to be
heard by the court. If such findings are made, the court shall, upon consideration of the recommendation of the agency, direct that an appropriate official
of the agency which employs such responsible officer or employee suspend
such officer or employee without pay for a period of not more than 60 days
or take other appropriate disciplinary or corrective action against him.
Id., cited in SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 51.
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for unlawfully withholding information.' In conference committee
proceedings, the House conferees strongly resisted attempts to include the sanctions provision as passed by the Senate. The House
conferees objected that the Senate provision gave the court "unusual disciplinary powers over Federal employees" whereas the compromise version gave employees the benefit of normal civil service
procedures. 10 As a result of the resistance of the House conferees, a
compromise was reached which adopted the language contained in
the present provision.11
The Amendments were vetoed by President Ford; however, he did
not give as a reason for the veto the inclusion of the sanctions provision. 2 Subsequently the Amendments were passed over the presi3
dential veto.
The Senate report on the Amendments documents the need and
purpose for such a provision. 4 The report notes that nowhere in
federal law are there specific sanctions against government employees who violate the law by withholding information, and general
administrative sanctions are not applied. 5 Furthermore, a number
of states have enacted Freedom of Information statutes that include
penalty provisions for violations of those statutes which are more
stringent than the sanctions provision proposed by the Senate Judiciary Committee. 6 The Senate report also notes that the standard
9. See H.R. 12,471, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
10. 120 CONG. REC. H 10,001 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1974) (report of Representative
Moorhead on the conference committee version of the FOIA amendments).
11. Id.
12. See H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (veto message).
13. See 120 CONG. REC. S 19,806 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974); 120 CONG. REc. H
10,864 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1974).
14. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 21.
15. Id. After citing several statutes that contain sanctions provisions against
unauthorized disclosure, the Senate report describes the lack of sanctions for illegal
withholdings:
But nowhere in the federal law are there effective sanctions for government
employees who violate the law by withholding information. Although general
administrative sanctions are available against government employees who
violate classification requirements (e.g., E.O. 11652, sec. 13; 5 Foreign Aff.
Man. § 992.1-4), Congressman Moorhead reported [Hearings, vol. I, supra
note 4, at 187] that his investigation of the numerous sanctions against
employees for disclosure of classified matter revealed that "not one case in
2,500 involved discipline for overclassification."
Id. See HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 12-37.
16. CODE OF ALA. tit. 41, § 146 (1959); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2807 (Supp. 1973);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 113-2-6 (Supp. 1969); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.02 (1975);
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to be applied - without reasonable basis in law - is neither vague
nor uncertain, and "is substantially more specific than language
presently in the law and regulations governing the conduct of em' 7
ployees and officials in the executive branch. '
The resistance of the House conferees to the Senate's enacted
provision seems to have focused upon two major points: that it is
inappropriate for a court to order an agency to take what is essentially an internal administrative action, 8 and that the procedure for
determining which employee is responsible for the withholding and
what sanctions should be applied is one which is overly complicated
and poses significant risks to the protection of important rights of
the employee." The House conferees were particularly determined
to preserve for employees the protections available to them under
civil service provisions. 0
The provision enacted into law places considerable responsibility
for the application of the sanctions provision upon the United States
Civil Service Commission. The provision sets out three requirements which must be met before Civil Service Commission participation in the application of the sanctions provision is invoked.
These requirements are: 1) that the court must order the production
of requested information; 2) that the court must have exercised its
discretion in assessing against the United States reasonable attorneys' fees and other litigation costs; and 3) that the court must issue
a written finding that the circumstances surrounding the withholding raise questions whether agency personnel acted arbitrarily or
§ 43.27 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975); IND. STAT. ANN. § 57606 (Burns Supp. 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-203 (1973); LA. REV. STAT. § 44-37
(1950); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, ch. 13, § 406 (1964); ANN. CODE MD. art. 76A, §
5 (1975); REV. STAT. NEB. § 84-712.03 (1971); NEv. REV. STAT. § 293.010(2) (1973);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 71-5-3 (1961); Onio REV. CODE ANN. § 149.99 (Page 1969); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 15-306 (1973). These statutes are collected in the SENATE REPORT,
supra note 5, at 63-64.
17. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 21-22.
18. The sanctions amendment, the most controversial part of the conference
committee's deliberations, was opposed by many House conferees on the grounds
that it gave the court such unusual disciplinary powers over federal employees. 120
CONG. REc. H 10,001 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1974) (report of Representative Moorhead
on the conference committee version of the Freedom of Information Act amendments).
19. This is evidenced by the conference resolution of the issue which ensures that
the employee has full rights of due process and the right to appeal any adverse
finding by the Commission. Id. at 10,002.
20. See id. at 10,001.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 116,
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capriciously with respect to the withholding. 2' The court is not required to find that the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously nor
to find specific employees responsible, but it is required to find that
the circumstances raise questions whether agency personnel acted
arbitrarily or capriciously. Furthermore, a court need not be convinced that any agency personnel have acted arbitrarily or capriciously - only that the circumstances raise such a question.
If these three requirements are met, the Civil Service Commission
is required to initiate promptly a proceeding to determine whether
disciplinary action is warranted. 22 In such a proceeding, the Commission determines which officer or employee was primarily responsible for the withholding and after a consideration of the evidence
submitted, makes findings and recommendations as to the appropriate actions to be taken. The Commission's recommendation is
binding upon the administrative authority which is then required
to take the action that the Commission recommends.
II.

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

A.

Applicability

Several questions arise concerning the interpretation and implementation of the provision. First, over whom does the Commission
have disciplinary authority? The provision states that "disciplinary
action is warranted against the officer or employee who was primarily responsible for the withholding. 213 An argument could be made
that the provision authorizes disciplinary action only against those
employees over whom the Civil Service Commission presently has
authority.24 Such an interpretation would exclude certain executive
21. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(F) (Supp. 1975), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)
(1970). It seems clear that a court would not have to grant access to all the information which the plaintiff requested. The provision reads "orders the production of
any agency records." Id. (emphasis added). See discussion regarding attorneys' fees
in text accompanying notes 52-58 infra.
22. Id. The sanctions provision uses the mandatory term "shall" and removes
from the Commission any discretion about commencing a proceeding.
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24. With certain statutory exceptions such as those contained in the Civil Service Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-22 (1970), and the Veterans' Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. §
7701 (1970), Commission review of agency disciplinary action is limited to employees in the competitive services. 5 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.3 (1975). Commission "adverse
actions" are authorized against an employee in the competitive service who is
appointed subject to investigation. 5 C.F.R. §§ 754.101-05 (1975). Under the Hatch
Act regulations the Commission initiates and adjudicates charges against employ-
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employees: officers in the uniformed services, employees in the excepted service, and officials appointed with the advice and consent
of the Senate. However, the legislative history of the provision
would seem to indicate the much broader interpretation that the
FOIA applies to all executive employees. 5 Thus, a more reasonable
interpretation would be that the FOIA delegates authority to the
Civil Service Commission over all employees within the executive
branch.
If this broader interpretation is adopted, constitutional questions
arise as to the application of the provision to political appointees
who serve at the pleasure of the President. Specifically, the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Myers v. United States6 seems to limit
the power of the Civil Service Commission to remove a cabinet
officer under the authority of the FOIA. In Myers the Court addressed the issue whether the President could remove, without the
advice and consent of the Senate, a postmaster who had been confirmed by the Senate. In upholding the authority of the President
to do so, the Court reasoned that unlike the power to confirm or
reject a presidential nominee, the power to remove an existing cabinet officer is vested in "the governmental authority which has administrative control.' ' 2 Strictly construed, the decision would seem
to preclude removal of a presidential appointee by means of a congressional authorization (such as FOIA) without the independent
concurrence of the President.
However, under the FOIA, the power of the President to remove
a cabinet officer is not affected. The President may still remove a
cabinet member in whom he has lost confidence. The FOIA provision is intended only as a method of ensuring that cabinet officials
are subject to the law. It can be argued that the burden imposed
ees in the competitive service while agencies are responsible for those tasks for
employees in the excepted service with the Commission reviewing the action on
appeal. Compare 5 C.F.R. §§ 733.131-37 (1975), with id. §§ 733.201-04. Excepted
service is defined in 5 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1975).
25. Both the House and Senate reports illustrate a range of abuses covering
employees in the excepted and competitive services and in the uniformed services.
See HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 33-37; SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 3.
Moreover, the Senate provision for which the conference provision was substituted
applied as does the present provision to any officer or employee. The term employee
is defined to include a member of a uniformed service. 5 U.S.C. § 2105(a)(1)(c)
(1970).
26. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
27. Id. at 121-22.
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upon the executive to replace an officer suspended under the Act is
no greater than the burden of replacement created when a presidential nominee is rejected by the Senate.
Removal of a cabinet officer by an authority other than the President presents additional constitutional problems. Removal of a cabinet officer who has the President's trust and confidence directly
impinges upon the relationship between the President and the cabinet officer which is uniquely part of the executive power. This
relationship rests upon the President's power of appointment.2 If
removal is seen as constitutionally inappropriate, a suspension, although analogous to a fine, removes from the President for a period
of time the services of a cabinet official. In practice, however, there
should arise few instances where this potential constitutional limitation on the authority of the Civil Service Commission would operate to prevent the application of sanctions.
Even if direct Commission discipline of cabinet officers were constitutionally prohibited, an alternative method exists of enforcing
the Act. The Civil Service Commission could make the appropriate
investigations as provided in the provision and recommend to the
President appropriate disciplinary action to be taken against the
cabinet officer. This procedure would ensure that the Civil Service
Commission conducted a thorough investigation and that the President had complete information regarding the behavior of a cabinet
official. In such a situation one would hope that the President would
act, under the duty to faithfully execute the laws, to ensure that the
purpose of the FOIA provision was fulfilled.
Other officials, including commissioners of the independent regulatory agencies, are subject to disciplinary action. 9 Two cases subsequent to Myers, Humphrey's Executor v. United States0 and
Wiener v. United States," have limited the scope of presidential
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
29. United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886). The Court stated:
We have no doubt that when Congress, by law, vests the appointment of
inferior officers in the heads of Departments it may limit and restrict the
power of removal as it deems best for the public interest. The constitutional
authority in Congress to thus vest the appointment implies authority to
limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact
in relation to the officers so appointed.
Id. at 485. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161 (1926); White v. Gates,
253 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 973 (1958).
30. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
31. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
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power to remove other employees. By stressing that officials who
exercise independent, quasi-judicial, or legislative functions do not
serve at the pleasure of the President, the cases would subject Commissioners of regulatory agencies to FOIA sanctions. The cases emphasize that the relationship between these officials and the President is not the same as that between the President and cabinet
officers. For non-cabinet officials, Congress may specify terms and
conditions of employment; " the FOIA sanctions provision is now
one such condition.
B.

The Scope of Corrective Action

A second potential ambiguity arises as to the nature of recommendations made to an agency by the Commission and implemented by the administrative authority. The provision first speaks
of the "disciplinary action . . . warranted against the officer or
employee" but in the last sentence states that the "administrative
authority shall take the corrective action that the Commission recommends. " " "Corrective action" could include action beyond "disciplinary action." In other words the Commission may have the
authority to recommend to the appropriate administrative authority not only disciplinary action against a particular employee, but
also action to be taken to correct the situation which gave rise to
the arbitrary and capricious withholding. Such an interpretation
might be appropriate in view of the Commission's function as the
chief personnel agency of the federal government. Such recommendations for corrective action could include different administrative
procedures or different forms of personnel control.
Militating against this interpretation is the inclusion in the Veterans' Preference Act 34 of the term "corrective action." 5 In that act
32. E.g., Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Humphrey's Ex'r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
33. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(F) (Supp. 1, 1975), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)
(1970) (emphasis added).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 7701 (1970).
35. The last sentence of 5 U.S.C. § 7701 (1970) permits corrective action: "The
administrative authority shall take the corrective action that the Commission finally recommends." This section resulted from agency contentions that the Commission's decisions on adverse action appeals of preference eligibles were only
"advisory." Guttman, The Development and Exercise of Appellate Powers in Adverse Action Procedures,19 AM. U.L. REv. 323, 325 (1970). Although Congress may
have been considering a limited meaning of the term in the Veterans' Preference
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the term, "corrective action," has been given a meaning requiring
an agency to take the action which the Commission recommends in
regard to disciplinary actions. 3 Moreover, it seems that the basis for
placing the sanctioning function in the Civil Service Commission
rather than another department was the Commission's particular
expertise in imposing discipline rather than its expertise in Freedom
of Information provisions. For this reason the selection of the Commission would suggest a definition of corrective action limited to
agency implementation of disciplinary action.
C.

The Standardfor DisciplinaryAction

What standard is the Commission to apply in determining
whether disciplinary action is warranted against the officer or employee who is primarily responsible for the withholding? The court
will refer a case to the Commission if the circumstances raise a
question as to whether agency personnel have acted arbitrarily or
capriciously with respect to the withholding. The Civil Service
Commission, in turn, is to follow a similar standard - whether the
acts were in fact arbitrary or capricious - in determining whether
the employee who was principally responsible should be disciplined.
This standard is one of the central issues running through the legislative debate upon the sanctions provisions. 37 The standard "arbitrarily or capriciously" links the employee's behavior to a general
body of law interpreting the appropriateness of administrative action.38 This same body of law should guide the Commission in deciding whether or not disciplinary action is warranted.
However, in applying and interpreting the phrase "arbitrarily or
Act, "corrective action" appears in other Commission regulations and has been
given a broader meaning. 5 C.F.R. § 5.4(b) (1975) requires an agency head to take
corrective action whenever the Commission finds that any officer or employee has
failed to adhere to personnel policies or regulations subject to the jurisdiction of
the Commission. Here corrective action includes more than disciplinary power and
allows modification of the personnel practices. In Equal Employment Opportunity
discrimination complaints the Commission has also given corrective action a meaning well beyond disciplinary action and includes changes in personnel procedures.
See M. BREWER, BEHIND THE PROMISES: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

(draft report issued June, 1972).

36. Fischer v. Haeberle, 80 F. Supp. 652 (E.D.N.Y. 1948); 41 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 44
(1949).
37. See 120 CONG. REc. H 10,001 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1974); SENATE REPORT, supra
note 5, at 21. See notes 10-17 & accompanying text supra.
38. See 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 30.01-.14 (1958).
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capriciously" the Commission should rely not only upon general
definitions of administrative law but also upon the legislative history of the provision. The legislative history indicates that the provision was intended to respond to the more egregious abuses of authority in refusing an FOIA request." The Commission may be justified
in giving a broader interpretation to the term than might be the case
where a court reviews the actions of an administrative agency. 0 As
an administrative agency the Commission has detailed knowledge
and expertise concerning the operation and procedures of federal
agencies augmented by extensive investigatory powers. Therefore,
many of the limitations constraining courts to adopt a limited and
restricted view of arbitrary or capricious conduct when reviewing
the actions of federal administrative agencies are not applicable to
the Commission.
Given the concern which the House conferees expressed regarding
the administrative protections for civil servants, it is interesting
that the provision does not specify the administrative procedure to
be followed by the Civil Service Commission either in determining
the responsibility of or in charging an officer or an employee." The
proposed regulations of the Commission" implementing this provision are clearly designed to protect the due process rights of charged
employees. Under the regulations, the Commission conducts an initial investigation to determine whether disciplinary action is warranted against the officer or employee primarily responsible for the
withholding.43 The General Counsel of the Commission reviews the
evidence from the investigation and either issues a letter of charges
on the employee setting forth the substance of the violation and the
nature of the proposed disciplinary action, or furnishes a written
statement of his findings and reasons for his decision not to press
39. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 21.
40. At the Freedom of Information Conference, Anthony Mondello, General
Counsel of the Civil Service Commission, indicated that the arbitrary and capricious standard was fairly clear in judging the activities of an individual in a specific
case. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE, CONFERENCE ON AMENDMENT TO THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT 144 (Washing-

ton, D.C., Feb. 6, 1975). Copies of the transcript are on file at the Freedom of
Information Clearinghouse, Washington, D.C. [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE
TRANSCRIPT].

41. This point was made in the House debate on the conference report. 120 CONG.
REc. H 10,006 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1974) (remarks of Congressman Erlenborn).
42. Proposed Civil Service Reg. §§ 294.1201-07, 40 Fed. Reg. 38144-45 (1975).
43. Id. § 294.1202, 40 Fed. Reg. 38144 (1975).
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charges to the agency concerned and to the court." The employee
may answer the charges and may be represented by counsel."5 The
General Counsel will then notify the employee of his decision, and
if disciplinary action is to be taken, will inform him that he may
obtain a hearing before an administrative law judge." If the employee elects not to seek a hearing, the General Counsel's decision
is final and the employee's agency is directed to take the specified
corrective action.47 If the employee elects to seek a hearing, the
administrative law judge's decision similarly is final, and exhausts
the employee's nonjudicial remedies." However, the Commissioners
may on their own motion reopen and reconsider any decision
reached.49 These provisions seem consistent with the legislative history of the provision which stresses that proceedings be conducted
in accordance with regular civil service procedures. 50 Likewise, the
emphasis upon civil service procedures shows that the Commission
has available a wide range of disciplinary sanctions, including
dismissal, suspension or reprimand.
D.

Attorneys' Fees and Other Costs

As previously suggested, before Civil Service Commission procedures may be invoked, a court must order the production of the
document, assess reasonable attorneys' fees and issue a finding. The
requirement that the court assess reasonable attorneys' fees and
other litigation costs may create a situation where it may be more
difficult for corporate than for individual complainants to invoke
the sanctions provision. This result may not have been intended by
the conferees.
It is clear that attorneys' fees are intended as enabling rather than
punitive.5 2 The legislative history of the sanctions provision suggests
that such attorneys' fees and costs were provided as a means of
encouraging citizens to appeal agency decisions regarding the FOIA.
44. Id. § 294.1203(a)-(c)(1).
45. Id. § 2 94 .1203(c)(2)-(3).
46. Id. § 294.1204(a), 40 Fed. Reg. 38145
47. Id. § 294.1204(b).
48. Id. § 294.1206.
49. Id. § 294.1207.
50. See notes 10, 19-20 & accompanying
dures under the Hatch Act see 5 C.F.R. 99
51. Under civil service procedures these
manager. 5 C.F.R. §§ 752.201-430 (1975).

52.

SENATE REPORT,

(1975).

text supra. For an example of proce733.131-37 (1975).
are sanctions available to an agency

supra note 5, at 17-18.

manager. 5 C.F.R. §§ 752.201-.304 (1975).
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While the legislative history is clear that the grant of such attorneys'
fees is discretionary, it is replete with references to the 1964 Civil
Rights Act,53 the Clean Air Act of 1970, 54 the Fair Housing Act of
1968,11 the Truth in Lending Act 6 and the Emergency School Aid
Act,57 all of which encourage individual actions by reimbursing costs
and attorneys' fees as a method of effectuating congressional policy.
To the extent that corporate complainants may have more difficulty
in illustrating that the award of attorneys' fees is necessary to encourage suit, they will be less able to invoke the sanctions provision.
Nevertheless, corporations may be able to invoke the sanctions provision when a court could appropriately find that they were accomplishing some public purpose beyond satisfying their own private
interest. The Senate report noted that one of the criteria contained
in the Senate bill for awarding attorneys' fees is whether the agency
acted without reasonable basis in law and suggests that a corporation may be able to recover attorneys' fees on this basis. 8 It should
also be noted that attorneys' fees for either corporate or individual
plaintiffs can be awarded if the plaintiff only substantially prevails.
Thus, if a complainant requests three documents and receives only
one, reimbursement may still be appropriate.
A related question concerns the costs which would be imposed on
an employee in defending himself in the administrative proceedings. Would it be appropriate for an agency to provide counsel or to
reimburse an employee for attorneys' fees in the subsequent civil
service proceeding? Neither the language of the provision nor the
legislative history suggests the answer. Normally an employee who
is charged in a disciplinary action by either the agency or the Commission has the obligation to obtain independent representation.
Independent counsel may also be in the employee's best interests.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b), 2000e-5(k) (1970).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970).

55. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (1970).
57. 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. II, 1972).
58. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 19, discussing S. 2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974) (as amended and enacted). Other criteria were: 1) the benefit to the public,
if any, deriving from the case, 2) the commercial benefit to the complainant, 3)
the nature of the complainants' interest in the records sought. These criteria suggest that a corporation might have more difficulty in obtaining attorneys' fees. The
enacted amendments did not contain these criteria, but the Senate report offers
some guidance as to the factors which should be considered in review of a request
for attorneys' fees. Id. at 19-20.
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When an individual employee is charged he may defend by denying
primary responsibility. Different officials within the agency may
have different interests in determining which employee or official
bears that responsibility. The agency's own position may to some
degree conflict with that of any individual employee. Therefore, an
employee would be well advised to obtain his own counsel.
E. Determinationof Primary Responsibility
At first glance the selection of the individual officer or employee
primarily responsible would seem to be a difficult task. However,
the Commission has broad investigative powers in the implementation of its legal authority." This investigative authority combined
with access to agency information should provide an adequate basis
for the Commission to make its determination."
The Commission's investigation should go beyond formal organization charts and seek to inquire into the actual conduct of affairs
which led to the arbitrary and capricious acts. In determining
whether an employee has acted arbitrarily or capriciously, questions
will arise regarding the effect to be given to the advice of counsel;
for example, an agency official faced with an FOIA request might
seek advice from an attorney in the General Counsel's office of the
agency as to whether or not the information sought must be released
under the Act. Does such a request for advice, and action based
upon that advice, insulate an employee from subsequent disciplinary action under the provision? The answer would depend upon
the circumstances, but advice of counsel should not automatically
insulate an agency employee from subsequent disciplinary action.
Certainly the seeking of advice and the reliance upon such advice
would be an important factor to be considered in determining
59. Civil Service rule 5 provides:
All officers and employees in the executive branch, and applicants or eligibles
for positions therein, shall give to the Commission or its authorized representatives all information and testimony in regard to matters inquired of
arising under the laws, rules, and regulations administered by the Commission. Whenever required by the Commission, such persons shall subscribe
such testimony and make oath or affirmation thereto before an officer authorized by law to administer oaths.
5 C.F.R. § 5.3 (1975).
60. At the Freedom of Information Conference, Mr. Mondello noted that the
freedom of information function was now within the Commission's jurisdiction and
its broad investigative powers would be available. CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPT, supra
note 40, at 162.
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whether or not the employee had acted arbitrarily or capriciously
and in determining the nature of the disciplinary action which was
warranted against the officer or employee."
However, even in criminal prosecutions, reliance upon advice of
counsel is not always sufficient.2 Neither should it be in an FOIA
request.
F.

The Role of the Court

The sanctions provision of the Act establishes a unique relationship between the courts and the administrative process. Under the
provision a court acts to determine if the circumstances surrounding
the withholding raise questions as to whether agency personnel
acted arbitrarily or capriciously. The question is then referred to the
Civil Service Commission to determine whether a particular employee has so acted. This unique arrangement raises at least two
questions as to the appropriate function of the court and of the Civil
Service Commission. 3 First, may the court make a determination
that the withholding was arbitrary and capricious, and if it does so,
is the Civil Service Commission bound by this determination? Second, what methods of judicial control exist for review of subsequent
Civil Service Commission actions?
Normally, the determination of an issue by a court is res judicata
as to a subsequent administrative determination64 if the court has
jurisdiction to consider the issue. The sanctions provision may be
61. See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 21. The bill reported by the Senate
Judiciary Committee provided that the court was to determine if the employee's
action in withholding the information was "without reasonable basis in law." S.
2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The Senate report noted that "the committee does
not intend this standard to imply that a responsible government employee will be
held liable ... where ... advice of counsel is sought and followed and where there
may be a reasonable difference of opinion. . . ." Id.
62. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 368 (1972).

63. In some ways the arrangement is not particularly unusual. In a number of
circumstances courts have directed the Civil Service Commission to undertake
administrative proceedings. Often this direction has come even when the Commission had initially refused to conduct the proceedings. When the additional procedures adjudicated the rights of a party, the relationship between courts and the
Civil Service Commission was essentially the same as that established by the
sanctions provision. In such cases the court may retain supervisory jurisdiction over
the remanded matter. Holden v. Finch, 446 F.2d 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Goodman
v. United States, 358 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Dabney v. Freeman, 358 F.2d 533
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Paroczay v. Hodges, 297 F.2d 439 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
64. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 1124 (1965).
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interpreted as giving a court jurisdiction to decide the issue of
whether personnel within the agency have in fact acted arbitrarily
or capriciously. The language of the statute states that before the
Civil Service Commission is required to commence proceedings the
court must issue a written finding that "the circumstances surrounding the withholding raise questions whether agency personnel
acted arbitrarily or capriciously." This language may be interpreted
as the minimum finding which the court must make to invoke the
process and would not prevent the court from deciding that the
circumstances show that agency personnel in fact acted arbitrarily
or capriciously.
Certainly, a finding by the court that agency personnel acted
arbitrarily or capriciously is within the court's competence and
should be binding on an employee charged in a subsequent civil
service proceeding. The court has expertise in determining whether
agency actions are arbitrary or capricious. 5 The parties before it in
an FOIA suit will be adequate to ensure a thorough adjudication of
the issue. When the question is whether the personnel of the agency
have acted arbitrarily or capriciously, the agency which has an interest in that question identical to that of an employee in a subsequent proceeding will adequately protect the interest of an employee subsequently charged."
The subsequent civil service proceedings must determine which
employee was primarily responsible for the withholding and select
the appropriate sanction to be applied. These are questions which
the Civil Service Commission is particularly capable of resolving.
This significant role left to the Commission would allay the concerns
in
of the House conferees regarding the use of civil service remedies
67
actions.
disciplinary
of
setting
the normal administrative
An interpretation of the provision that grants to courts the power
to determine whether agency personnel acted arbitrarily or capri65. That courts are competent to decide this issue is illustrated by the Senate
report which suggests one standard to be applied in determining whether or not
attorneys' fees should be allowed is whether the agency acted without reasonable
basis in law. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 19. The standard "without reasonable
basis in law" is at least as broad as the arbitrary and capricious standard.
66. It should be noted that the court would not be finding against a particular
employee, but rather that agency personnel in general had acted arbitrarily or
capriciously. Thus, any intra-agency dispute as to the appropriate party to charge
would remain an open question, and the eventual defendant would not be prejudiced by the court's general finding.
67. See notes 18-20 & accompanying text supra.
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ciously would allocate to courts and to the Civil Service Commission
responsibilities within the areas of their particular competence.
Moreover, when a court is able to decide on the evidence before it
that agency personnel have acted arbitrarily or capriciously, an additional problem would be alleviated. The discretion of the Civil
Service Commission not to issue charges in a matter referred by a
court would be appropriately curtailed in those situations in which
it was possible for the court to determine whether the agency personnel had acted arbitrarily or capriciously.
In cases in which a court finds only that questions exist regarding
whether agency personnel have acted arbitrarily or capriciously,
judicial review may take two forms. First, the provision mandates
the Commission to promptly initiate proceedings. The duty may be
enforced through mandamus. Second, the court refers the determination of the matter to the Commission, which in turn makes recommendations to an administrative agency. If the agency should
arbitrarily or capriciously refuse to commence disciplinary actions,
the court should be empowered to review the abuse of a power based
upon the initial finding by the court and its continuing jurisdiction
over the matter.6 8
G. Role of the Plaintiff
Closely related to the problems of a court's role in reviewing subsequent Commission actions is the role of the original FOIA plaintiff
which remains ambiguous under the sanctions provision. Under the
Senate version, where a court determined and applied the sanction,
the FOIA plaintiff would have played an important role in that
determination. Under the enacted provision, what role should the
FOIA plaintiff play in the administrative proceedings conducted by
the Civil Service Commission? The provision would seem to authorize the Commission to promulgate regulations giving the original
FOIA plaintiff some formalized role such as intervention in the
subsequent hearings. Since the plaintiff is the individual who originally brought the potentially arbitrary and capricious acts of federal
personnel to the attention of the court and of the Commission, a
formal role for such a plaintiff in the administrative proceedings
would seem appropriate. Nothing would seem to prohibit the Commission from providing for citizen intervention in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding. Although the Commission has no regulations
68. See note 63 supra.
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providing for such third party intervention in civil service proceedings," the background and purposes of the sanctions provision
would seem to authorize such a regulation. While an original FOIA
plaintiff may be a necessary witness in a subsequent disciplinary
action, his role should be formalized by appropriate regulation.
Even if a plaintiff is not granted a specific role in the administrative proceedings, a question remains as to plaintiff's standing to
seek review of Commission decisions not to recommend disciplinary
action, impose modified penalties or acquit an employee. Although
the provision does not specifically refer to the interests of a plaintiff,
the legislative history of the Act suggests that an FOIA plaintiff has
such standing.7 0 The plaintiff has a significant role in triggering the
sanctions provision. The fact that the plaintiff will already have
received the documents requested and reasonable attorneys' fees
and costs does not necessarily vindicate in toto his injury resulting
from the improper actions of the government officials. The legislative history of the sanctions provision recognizes the importance of
sanctions to the fair administration of the FOIA and relies upon the
plaintiff to vindicate those interests. Without the plaintiff's involvement no means exist to review the operation and performance of the
Civil Service Commission in its refusal to proceed with actions
under this important provision. As an injured party the plaintiff has
an interest that just penalties be imposed. The legislative history
suggests that this interest of the plaintiff furthers the public interest
to be served by the imposition of such sanctions - the prevention
of abuse. 71 Judicial review of subsequent administrative action
would, of course, conform to the accepted standards of administrative review which give appropriate weight to the expertise of the
administrative agency.72
69. The regulations do, however, provide for a type of third-party involvement
in cases involving general allegations of agency discrimination in personnel matters
which do not relate to an individual complaint. See 5 C.F.R. § 713.251 (1975).
Under this regulation a third party who is dissatisfied with an agency's action on
his complaint may request the Commission to review the action. Id. § 713.251(c).
70. The emphasis in the Senate report upon encouraging private individuals to
vindicate the public's right to know is an example of the importance attached to
an FOIA plaintiff. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 70-74; SENATE REPORT, supra
note 5, at 18-19.
71. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 70-74; SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 1819.
72. See 4 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 30.01, at 191-92 (1958). See
generally id. § 30.01-.14.
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CONCLUSION

The FOIA sanctions provision is important as a congressional
recognition of personal accountability and as a means of controlling
administrative abuse. The provision has acted in part to protect the
relationship between government employee and citizen in the important area of public access to information. The sanctions provision illustrates one way in which an accountability process can be
designed. Considerable work remains and experimentation of alternative schemes should be encouraged. Personal accountability is a
concept embedded in our law and the task is to make it operative
in an administrative setting. In a complex administrative bureaucracy personal accountability is a means of ensuring that government
decisions are controlled by law and that those affected by government wrongdoing have a mechanism to impose personal accountability upon public employees. Our bitter national experience of the
last few years shows that government decisions must be controlled
by law rather than personal loyalty, individual will or avarice. Personal accountability is a method of accomplishing that purpose.
With the development of new tort remedies 3 and the FOIA sanctions provision, the wind is blowing in the direction of such account4
ability.
73. For extended discussion of these new remedies and a reassessment of personal accountability in general see Vaughn, The PersonalAccountability of Public
Employees, infra at 85.
74. For example, the Senate Subcommittee on Federal Spending Practices, Efficiency and Open Government adopted, as part of the Government in the Sunshine
Act, a provision which would allow costs to be assessed against an individual
agency member who had intentionally and repeatedly violated the provisions of the
Act. S.5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(i) (1975).

